Path parsing drops '.' components, empty components and a trailing '/'. A request like dir/. was therefore accepted, and a write renamed over the directory itself instead of failing. The path text is now checked as given. Other fixes: - A replaced file keeps its permission bits. - A connection's slot is released even when its handler panics. - Connections close after 60 seconds without a request. - Temporary files get unique names and are not listed. - A request of exactly the line limit is accepted. A new test swaps a link between a directory inside the granted root and one outside while reads and writes run, and checks that nothing outside is read or written. weft-appd no longer sets WEFT_FILE_PORTAL_SOCKET for the runtime, which no longer reads it.
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Security Model
Principles
WEFT OS enforces a capability-based security model. No capability is granted by default; all capabilities are declared in wapp.toml and verified before an app runs.
Capability Verification
weft-pack check validates capability strings against the shared vocabulary in weft_ipc_types::capability. Unknown capability strings are rejected. At launch, weft-appd derives the session's grants from the manifest and refuses to start a package with a capability that is unknown, unsupported or unsatisfiable. weft-runtime enforces the grants it is given: read-only directories are preopened read-only, and each host import checks its grant on every call. See the capability table in architecture.md.
Installing a package does not yet ask the user to approve its capabilities; every declared, supported capability is granted at launch.
Process Isolation
Each app session runs as a separate OS process (weft-runtime). When systemd is available, the process is wrapped in a systemd scope (weft-apps.slice) with CPUQuota=200% and MemoryMax=512M.
Filesystem Isolation
Apps access the filesystem only through WASI preopened directories. Each capability maps to a specific host path preopened at a fixed guest path. The weft-file-portal process applies the same directory grants and access modes. It opens each granted directory once and resolves every request beneath that descriptor with openat2(RESOLVE_BENEATH), so the kernel keeps the operation inside the directory: .. and links pointing outside are refused, also when a link is swapped in while the operation runs; links that stay inside are followed. This needs Linux 5.6 or later; without openat2 every operation fails. Requests must name an absolute path without ., .. or empty components; files are limited to 16 MiB, listings to 10,000 entries, requests to one line of about 22 MiB, and the portal to 4 connections at a time, each closed after 60 seconds without a request. Writes replace a file atomically, keeping its permission bits but not its owner, extended attributes or hard links (a write to a name that is a link replaces the link), and never create directories. A granted directory that cannot be opened when the portal starts is not served. Components cannot currently reach its socket, since the runtime grants them no socket access, and the socket's path is not passed to them.
Package Signing
Packages are signed with Ed25519 (ed25519-dalek). The signature covers the SHA-256 hash of wapp.toml and app.wasm. weft-pack verify checks the signature before installation.
For verified read-only package storage, weft-pack build-image produces an EROFS image protected with dm-verity. Mounting requires the setuid weft-mount-helper which calls veritysetup.
Seccomp
weft-runtime supports an optional seccomp BPF filter (compiled in with --features seccomp). The filter blocks a set of dangerous syscalls: ptrace, process_vm_readv, process_vm_writev, kexec_load, mount, umount2, setuid, setgid, chroot, pivot_root, init_module, finit_module, delete_module, bpf, perf_event_open, acct. All other syscalls are allowed; the policy is permissive with a syscall blocklist, not a strict allowlist.
Wayland Surface Isolation
Each app registers its surface with the compositor via zweft_shell_manager_v1. The compositor enforces that each surface belongs to the session that created it. The app cannot render outside its assigned surface slot.
JavaScript Engine (SpiderMonkey)
The Servo embedding uses SpiderMonkey as its JavaScript engine. SpiderMonkey is a complex JIT compiler. The following are known limitations that are not mechanically addressed by WEFT OS at this time:
- SpiderMonkey is not sandboxed at the OS level beyond what the Wasmtime/Servo process isolation provides.
- JIT-compiled JavaScript runs with the same memory permissions as the rest of the Servo process.
- SpiderMonkey vulnerabilities (CVE-class bugs in the JIT or parser) would affect the isolation boundary.
Current mitigation: the weft-app-shell process runs as an unprivileged user with no ambient capabilities. The seccomp filter blocks the most dangerous privilege-escalation syscalls when enabled. WEFT does not claim stronger JavaScript engine isolation than Gecko/SpiderMonkey itself provides.
Not addressed: JIT spraying, speculative execution attacks on SpiderMonkey's JIT output, and parser-level memory corruption bugs. These require either a Wasm-sandboxed JS engine or hardware-enforced control-flow integrity, neither of which is implemented.
The bounded statement is: WEFT OS relies on SpiderMonkey's own security properties for the JavaScript execution boundary. Any SpiderMonkey CVE that allows code execution within the renderer process is in-scope for the WEFT OS threat model.