WEFT_OS/docs/security.md
Marco Allegretti c28a829624
fix(runtime): enforce effective capability grants per session
Every host import was registered and callable whatever the package
declared, read-only directory capabilities were preopened read-write,
and appd launched packages whose capabilities it could not satisfy. The
fetch import also could not be linked: the host returned a tuple where
the WIT declares the response record, so any component importing
weft:app/fetch failed to instantiate.

One capability vocabulary now lives in weft_ipc_types::capability and
is used by weft-pack, weft-appd and weft-runtime. weft-appd derives a
session's grants once, before the session exists, and refuses the launch
with error 403 when a capability is unknown, unsupported (hw:gpu:*) or
unsatisfiable (documents without an XDG documents directory). The
documents directory now comes from user-dirs.dirs instead of a guessed
~/Documents.

The runtime receives grants explicitly (--grant CAP, --preopen
HOST::GUEST::ro|rw), preopens read-only directories read-only, and checks
the grant on every notifications, clipboard and fetch call. Fetch accepts
only http and https to granted hosts, returns redirects and HTTP error
statuses as responses instead of following or failing them, and bounds
connect time, total time and response size. The file portal takes
read-only directories with --allow-read and refuses writes there.

tests/runtime/check_grants.py runs the real runtime on a probe component
under each kind of grant and checks the outcome of every operation; it
fails when read-only data is writable or an import ignores its grant.
The appd dispatch tests that read WEFT_RUNTIME_BIN now hold the env lock
shared with the tests that set it.
2026-10-09 08:08:58 +00:00

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3.9 KiB
Markdown

# Security Model
## Principles
WEFT OS enforces a capability-based security model. No capability is granted by default; all capabilities are declared in `wapp.toml` and verified before an app runs.
## Capability Verification
`weft-pack check` validates capability strings against the shared vocabulary in `weft_ipc_types::capability`. Unknown capability strings are rejected. At launch, `weft-appd` derives the session's grants from the manifest and refuses to start a package with a capability that is unknown, unsupported or unsatisfiable. `weft-runtime` enforces the grants it is given: read-only directories are preopened read-only, and each host import checks its grant on every call. See the capability table in `architecture.md`.
Installing a package does not yet ask the user to approve its capabilities; every declared, supported capability is granted at launch.
## Process Isolation
Each app session runs as a separate OS process (`weft-runtime`). When systemd is available, the process is wrapped in a systemd scope (`weft-apps.slice`) with `CPUQuota=200%` and `MemoryMax=512M`.
## Filesystem Isolation
Apps access the filesystem only through WASI preopened directories. Each capability maps to a specific host path preopened at a fixed guest path. The `weft-file-portal` process applies the same directory grants and access modes, but checks paths lexically: it blocks `..` traversal, not symbolic links. Components cannot currently reach its socket, since the runtime grants them no socket access.
## Package Signing
Packages are signed with Ed25519 (`ed25519-dalek`). The signature covers the SHA-256 hash of `wapp.toml` and `app.wasm`. `weft-pack verify` checks the signature before installation.
For verified read-only package storage, `weft-pack build-image` produces an EROFS image protected with dm-verity. Mounting requires the setuid `weft-mount-helper` which calls `veritysetup`.
## Seccomp
`weft-runtime` supports an optional seccomp BPF filter (compiled in with `--features seccomp`). The filter blocks a set of dangerous syscalls: `ptrace`, `process_vm_readv`, `process_vm_writev`, `kexec_load`, `mount`, `umount2`, `setuid`, `setgid`, `chroot`, `pivot_root`, `init_module`, `finit_module`, `delete_module`, `bpf`, `perf_event_open`, `acct`. All other syscalls are allowed; the policy is permissive with a syscall blocklist, not a strict allowlist.
## Wayland Surface Isolation
Each app registers its surface with the compositor via `zweft_shell_manager_v1`. The compositor enforces that each surface belongs to the session that created it. The app cannot render outside its assigned surface slot.
## JavaScript Engine (SpiderMonkey)
The Servo embedding uses SpiderMonkey as its JavaScript engine. SpiderMonkey is a complex JIT compiler. The following are known limitations that are not mechanically addressed by WEFT OS at this time:
- SpiderMonkey is not sandboxed at the OS level beyond what the Wasmtime/Servo process isolation provides.
- JIT-compiled JavaScript runs with the same memory permissions as the rest of the Servo process.
- SpiderMonkey vulnerabilities (CVE-class bugs in the JIT or parser) would affect the isolation boundary.
**Current mitigation:** the `weft-app-shell` process runs as an unprivileged user with no ambient capabilities. The seccomp filter blocks the most dangerous privilege-escalation syscalls when enabled. WEFT does not claim stronger JavaScript engine isolation than Gecko/SpiderMonkey itself provides.
**Not addressed:** JIT spraying, speculative execution attacks on SpiderMonkey's JIT output, and parser-level memory corruption bugs. These require either a Wasm-sandboxed JS engine or hardware-enforced control-flow integrity, neither of which is implemented.
The bounded statement is: *WEFT OS relies on SpiderMonkey's own security properties for the JavaScript execution boundary. Any SpiderMonkey CVE that allows code execution within the renderer process is in-scope for the WEFT OS threat model.*