Pruning compared a list of the declared capabilities with the set of
approved ones by length. A manifest repeating a capability could
therefore keep an approval it no longer declared. The two are now
compared as sets.
weft-pack approve <id> <capability>... replaced the app's approval
instead of adding to it. It also accepted any app ID and any
capability, which let an approval cover a capability declared later. It
now adds to the approval, requires the app to be installed, and for a
package weft-pack can read, requires each listed capability to be
declared. The docs state the remaining limits for verified images.
weft-pack approve read only the user store, so an app in the system
store, or installed as a verified image, could not be approved. The
remedy the launch refusal named also did not work.
approve now resolves the package in weft-appd's store order. It also
accepts the capabilities by name, which is how an image is approved,
since weft-pack cannot read its manifest.
An install or rollback without --approve now drops approvals for
capabilities the package no longer declares. A capability declared
again later therefore asks again. Both commands report what still needs
approval. weft-appd validates capabilities without side effects first,
then refuses unapproved ones, then derives grants, so an unsupported
capability is reported as such and not as one needing approval. The
docs state that approvals are per user.
Every capability a package declared was granted at launch, so a signed
package received all the permissions it asked for. Blueprint 5.2 rules
that out.
A package now gets only the capabilities the user approved. weft-pack
install --approve approves those the installed package declares, and
weft-pack approve <id> approves those of the installed app later.
Without approval, install lists what still needs it. The approval is
recorded in $XDG_DATA_HOME/weft/approvals/<id>. weft-appd refuses to
launch an app declaring a capability the record does not hold, with
403 and the capabilities named, after refusing unknown or unsupported
ones as before.
An update that declares a new capability needs approval again, and
uninstalling forgets the approval. Private app data is a minimal
execution resource and needs no approval, so Notes and the existing
fixtures are unchanged.
Unit tests cover the approval record, install and approve, an update
adding a capability, uninstall, and appd refusing and then launching.
tests/frame/check_update.py launches a real app declaring notifications:
it is refused until weft-pack approve, then runs.
The test also covers the refusal reported when no other store has the
app. The new comment states that a package found and then refused is not
replaced by another store's copy. The architecture doc says that a
re-signed copy of the same content is visible at once.
Installing the same content with another signature file gives the same
revision name. The existing revision, possibly the active one, was
removed before the new copy was renamed into place, so a failure in
between left the store link pointing at nothing. The new copy now
replaces it in one exchange.
If an activation fails before its switch, the kept rollback link is
restored, and dropping a stale rollback link is flushed. The staging
claim is released once the copy is placed, so launches are not refused
while the operation finishes. A launch now passes over a store whose
entry for the app is unusable, as the listing does.
An update of a package directory from before revisions removed it
together with the app data an earlier weft-appd kept in its data
directory. That data is now moved out under the uninstall rules first,
or the update stops.
A failure after the store link was switched removed the new revision
while the link pointed to it. The switch is now the commit point;
cleanup after it is left to collection.
Other fixes:
- A revision is reused only when its content and signature file match.
- The revisions directory is flushed before activation.
- A rollback link is not inherited by a new installation, and rollback
refuses a link to the active revision.
- Staging and unpacking directories are held while in use, so another
operation never collects them.
- weft-appd refuses a launch, instead of waiting, while a package
operation holds the revision.
- Listings read only an app's active package.
check_update.py installs a test app with weft-pack, runs it with the
real runtime and app shell, and checks the following:
- an update leaves a running session on the bytes and the revision it
started from;
- a failed update keeps the active revision;
- a later launch gets the update;
- the old revision is collected only after its session ends;
- rollback reactivates the kept revision;
- uninstall refuses new launches without disturbing a running session,
and a later uninstall removes the revisions.
An installed package could not be updated: install refused it, and
uninstalling and reinstalling it was neither atomic nor safe for running
sessions, which read files from the package directory.
A package is now staged, checked, verified, admitted and flushed. It is
then renamed to an immutable revision named by its content digest,
<store>/.revisions/<id>/<digest>, and activated by one rename of the
link <store>/<id>. A failure or interruption at any point leaves the
previously active revision active, and a failed first installation
leaves nothing installed. The revision active before an update is kept,
and weft-pack rollback makes it active again after checking it against
the owner record. Other revisions are collected by later operations on
the app, unless a session still runs from them. Leftovers of interrupted
operations are collected too.
weft-appd follows the store link only to one of the app's own
revisions. It runs a session from the revision directory and holds a
shared lock on it for the session's lifetime, so an update, rollback or
uninstall never changes or removes the bytes of a running session. A
package directory from before revisions is still read. An update
replaces it in one exchange, and only while no session runs from it.
Claiming data does not depend on finding earlier-layout data, so an
install that claims it no longer needs HOME. Tests cover a first launch
and a first install with an unusable HOME refusing and recording no
owner, and the security docs state the HOME requirement.
Without an absolute HOME the earlier data layout could not be checked,
so a first-launch or install owner record was written anyway and that
data was migrated to the new owner later. Both now refuse instead.
Uninstall keeps an owner record while data exists in either layout, or
while it cannot tell. Launch tests use a private HOME, and the test
data-home cleanup never removes the running process's own.
App data in the earlier layout, <home>/.local/share/weft/apps/<id>/data,
is migrated to the app data directory after the owner check, so a
trusted package from another store could be recorded as owner on its
first launch and then receive that data. Both layouts now count as
existing data, in weft-appd and in weft-pack install, so unowned data
is only given away with --claim-data. The refusal says how to claim
it. Stale test data homes are removed only when their process has
exited, and the app-data check records the owner of the data it seeds.
The manifest is now read once, and its bytes must match the verified
inventory, so a manifest swapped in around the check cannot grant
capabilities or entries the owner did not sign. A trusted package with
no owner record is recorded as its signer's on its first launch, and
app data without a recorded owner is refused rather than handed to the
first publisher, matching weft-pack's --claim-data rule. A damaged
trust store or owner record is a host error (500), and the trust store
is not consulted for development content.
Supervisor tests use a private data home and an empty trust store; the
counter check runs with a private home, and the notes check records
the owner of the data it seeds.
weft-appd trusted an installed directory as installed, so content
changed after installation, or signed by a key since removed from the
trust store, still ran with the owner's app data. Before anything
starts, a package recorded as a publisher's must carry that
publisher's valid signature over its current content, with the key
still trusted; a package with no record must be signed by a trusted
key; development content, recorded by weft-pack install --dev, runs
unverified. Failures are refused with code 403.
The desktop checks trust the demo key, and the confinement check,
whose package deliberately holds a link, records it as development
content.
A relative store none of whose components existed failed, because the
empty ancestor was treated as a directory to create. New store
directories are now created private and set to 0755 through a
descriptor opened without following links, so a swapped path cannot
redirect the mode change. The security docs state the hard-link
protection as the kernel enforces it.
A first root install under a restrictive umask created the store and its
parents unreadable to other users even though the package inside was
0755/0644. Missing store directories are now created and set to 0755.
The copy comment and the hard-link note in the security docs describe
exactly what is checked and what the kernel enforces.
Modes requested at creation were masked by the umask, so a root install
under umask 077 produced system packages other users could not read.
They are now set explicitly after creation. The copy reads each
directory's names and closes the listing before recursing, so deep
trees hold one descriptor per level. The owner-lock test now uses an
ID that would otherwise open, and the docs describe the copy check and
its device-node residual precisely.
Checking each file's device and inode against a path-based listing still
followed a directory replaced by a link after it was listed. The copy now
holds each source directory open and opens its entries relative to it
with O_NOFOLLOW, checking type, device and inode against the listing.
Only real packages in other stores keep an owner record, the store list
is deduplicated, archive names must be valid app IDs, and the help text
is wrapped.
The app ID now comes from the staged copy, so a source changed after
validation cannot steer paths outside the store or the owners directory,
and lock_owner refuses invalid IDs. Copied files must keep the device and
inode they were listed with, and are opened without following links or
blocking on FIFOs, which no longer depends on /proc. Uninstall keeps an
owner record while another known store holds the package, and a failure
to inspect app data refuses rather than counting as no data.
Names with control characters have no content digest, so a crafted name
can no longer reproduce other inventory lines and drop signed files.
Installs and uninstalls of an ID hold a per-ID lock, so a failed
concurrent install cannot remove the record of the one that won. App
data without a recorded owner goes to a new owner only with
--claim-data. Uninstall releases a record left by an interrupted
install once no data remains. Files are opened without following links
and, on Linux, must be the file that was listed.
Installed files take fixed modes (0644, or 0755 when executable) and
directories 0755, so a world-writable source cannot install as such.
An owner record created by an installation whose package then fails to
be placed is removed, and records are written under a temporary name
and linked into place, so they are never partial. Archives unpack into
a random private directory that is always removed. Uninstall frees an
ID only when the app data is truly absent, signatures are checked with
verify_strict, and list marks development installs.
weft-pack install copied any package into the store: signatures were
never checked, no key was trusted for anything, any publisher could
install over another's app ID and reach its retained data, and the
signing inventory followed symbolic links, so a package could sign and
install files from outside itself.
Installation now requires a signature by a key in the trust store
($XDG_CONFIG_HOME/weft/trusted-keys and /etc/weft/trusted-keys, or
$WEFT_TRUSTED_KEYS alone). Unsigned or untrusted content installs only
with --dev, recorded as development content. The package is copied
into the store, checked and verified on that copy, and renamed into
place, so the verified bytes are the installed bytes.
The first installation of an app ID records its owner beside the app
data; later installations must have the same owner, so neither another
publisher nor a development build can take the ID over. The record
outlives uninstall while app data remains.
The content digest moves to weft_ipc_types::trust and refuses links,
special files and non-UTF-8 paths; it keeps the existing inventory
format, and both committed demo signatures still verify. Catalogs list
only directories named after their package ID. The security guide
described a signature over wapp.toml and app.wasm only; it now
describes the full inventory and the trust and ownership rules.
- A verified image in any store now takes precedence over a directory
install in any store, so a user's directory cannot shadow a system
image of the same app.
- The package root must be a directory and wapp.toml a regular file,
not links to content outside the root the entries are checked in.
- Incomplete or malformed image metadata is refused with 403; a
missing helper, a failed mount or an unreadable manifest with 500.
- A supervisor test records the arguments of both children and
requires the resolved component and UI document.
The documentation states that the root hash is read from the store
and not yet authenticated.
The runtime, the app shell and grant derivation each searched the
package stores and parsed wapp.toml on their own, so they could use
different roots; the runtime ignored [runtime].module, the image loader
looked for companion files the builder never wrote, and a failed image
mount fell back to the mutable directory install.
weft-appd now resolves a launch once: a verified image wins over a
directory in the same store, and when any image file exists the image
must mount or the launch is refused. The manifest must declare the
requested ID, and both entries must be plain relative paths to regular
files without links. The runtime receives --module and the app shell
--ui; neither looks for the package. Grants come from the same
manifest, and the mount belongs to the session.
The manifest parser and the image file names move to weft-ipc-types,
shared with weft-pack, whose check now applies the same entry rules.
Mapper devices are named after their per-launch mountpoint, so
concurrent sessions no longer collide.
Review of the renderer policy found loads it did not see or judged
wrongly:
- Loads Servo does not attribute to the webview, such as
navigator.sendBeacon(), reached the network. They are all refused.
- On a redirect Servo reports the first URL again, so every redirect
is refused.
- A symbolic link inside the UI directory led anywhere on disk; file
loads are checked again after resolving links.
- Only about:blank is allowed among about: URLs.
The Servo pin moves to 5d90f51, which keeps compiled classic scripts
rooted until they run (a parser-blocking script waiting for a failed
stylesheet import crashed the content process) and withholds
navigator.servo from about:blank and about:srcdoc documents.
The confinement check gains probes for links, workers, beacons,
imports, fonts and srcdoc frames, and its WebSocket server completes
the handshake. The slow stylesheet's delay now starts when the host
first tries to open it.
An application page could load any local file through file: URLs and
reach any network destination with images, fetch, XHR or WebSockets,
bypassing the component's fetch grants. The shell now checks every
resource load: files inside the UI directory, inline data:, blob: and
about: resources and the session bridge are allowed; anything else
fails with a network error before a request leaves the renderer.
tests/frame/check_confinement.py probes each path on the nested desktop
and requires that no HTTP request or TCP connection reaches the host.
The frame check's slow stylesheet becomes a file next to the page held
back with a file lease, so it stays inside the confined scope.
IPC_FORWARD held the registry lock while awaiting a send to the
component; with a full queue it stalled appd, and once the relay was
closed it locked the registry again and deadlocked. It now sends without
waiting and reports an error when the session has no relay or its queue
is full.
A relay whose component disconnected left the session running with no
way to exchange messages. The session now stops when its IPC connection
closes. The relay releases its task and socket when dropped, so a
cancelled supervisor leaks neither, and the socket is created with mode
0600.
New tests fail against the previous code: IPC_FORWARD against a missing
relay and a full queue must answer at once, and a runtime that closes
its IPC connection while still running must end its session. The test
runtime directory lives under target/ instead of one directory per run.
dispatch opened each session's IPC socket and registered its sender
before the supervisor existed, and nothing released them: a relay whose
runtime never connected waited forever with its socket file in place,
and every stopped session left its sender registered, so app messages
for it were still accepted and queued.
The supervisor now opens the relay after its early checks, and the
session owns it: every exit path stops the relay task, removes the
socket and unregisters the sender. A session whose socket cannot be
opened does not start. The relay accepts a single connection.
A dispatch-level test launches a package whose runtime reports ready
and exits without connecting; it requires the stopped session to leave
no sender and no socket, and fails against the previous code. The
Counter and Notes checks pass end to end.
weft-pack uninstall moved earlier app data only when the package
manifest could be read and declared an app-data capability, and only
when the store path was spelled exactly as the user store; otherwise it
removed the package directory with the data in it. A directory left
holding only data by an earlier weft-appd, which has no manifest, was
deleted that way.
A data directory is now never removed with a package. In the user
store, recognised by its real location rather than its spelling, it is
moved when the package declares app data or its manifest cannot be
read; in every other case uninstall stops and changes nothing. Tests
cover a directory holding only data, a store reached through '..', a
symbolically linked home, an app without the capability and another
store.
weft-appd reports both locations when a move fails with an I/O error and
creates the data directory with mode 0700 instead of tightening it
afterwards.
The editor accepted typing before the stored notes had loaded, and a
load reply then adopted the stored revision for text edited from
nothing, so a save replaced notes the user never saw; the same happened
when typing during a Discard reload. The editor is now read-only until
it holds the stored text.
Two Notes windows saving at once shared one staging file and could each
pass the revision check, storing a mix of both texts. Each save now
holds a lock file while it checks the revision and replaces the notes,
writes its own staging file, syncs it before the rename, and removes
only that file on failure; a lock left by an ended session expires
after ten seconds.
A save larger than the 64 KiB app message limit after JSON encoding was
dropped on its way and left the page waiting forever with Save
disabled. The page now refuses such saves before sending, gives up on a
save after ten seconds without a reply, and the component answers every
request, including malformed ones, so no request goes unanswered.
check_notes.py now pauses weft-runtime with SIGSTOP to make text typed
during a save and keys typed during a Discard reload deterministic; the
previous package fails it by saving text typed before the reload. The
building guide lists the application checks, the pinned toolchain for
reproducing the demo binaries and the demo key path.
weft-pack treated any top-level data directory in a package as app
data from the earlier layout, in every store and for every app: a
package shipping data/ lost that content to the app data directory on
uninstall and could then no longer be uninstalled. Data is now moved
only from ~/.local/share/weft/apps/<id>/data, the only place earlier
versions wrote it, and only for packages declaring an app-data
capability; packages may no longer contain a top-level data entry.
The move left an empty package directory behind, which then blocked
weft-pack install although nothing was listed; an emptied package
directory is now removed, and install accepts an empty leftover. The
rename uses RENAME_NOREPLACE, so a target created after the check is
reported as a conflict instead of being replaced, and a move across
filesystems is refused with a message naming both locations instead of
a bare OS error. Directories moved by weft-pack are made private too,
and a symbolic link at the target is refused rather than followed.
The system UI now shows launch refusals, which it only logged, and the
weft-appd unit may write under ~/.local/share/weft, which
ProtectSystem=strict made read-only. check_app_data.py also types into
Notes after the move and requires the save to reach the moved file, and
checks that no empty package directory remains.
The Notes demo exchanged hand-escaped strings: the page turned every
literal backslash-n into a line break on load and save, the component
escaped only some control characters, so other text produced invalid
replies, and every reply replaced the editor contents, discarding text
typed while a save was in flight. Saves wrote the file in place and
replaced whatever another Notes window had stored.
Requests and replies are now JSON objects. The component reports a
revision (a hash of the stored bytes) with each load; a save names the
revision it was edited from and is refused when the stored notes have
changed since, so a second window's text is never replaced silently. The
file is written beside notes.txt and renamed over it. A save
acknowledgement updates only the saved state, never the editor, and
Discard reloads the stored notes.
tests/frame/check_notes.py edits Notes with real keyboard input on the
nested desktop: text with a literal backslash sequence, quotes, a tab and
non-ASCII characters is stored byte for byte, text typed during a save
survives, and a save after another window changed the file is refused.
It fails against the previous package, which turned the seeded "\n"
into a line break. app.wasm is rebuilt and the package re-signed with the
demo key.
App data lived in ~/.local/share/weft/apps/<id>/data, inside the user
package store under the installed package directory. Uninstalling a
package deleted its data, and launching a package installed elsewhere
created that directory, after which installing the package for the user
failed because its directory already existed.
App data now lives in $XDG_DATA_HOME/weft/app-data/<id>, one shared
rule in weft_ipc_types::package, and is made private (0700) on every
launch. Data in the earlier location is moved there in one rename on the
first launch with an app-data capability, and by weft-pack before it
uninstalls a package or installs over a directory holding only data. If
both locations hold data, nothing is moved: the launch is refused with
409 and weft-pack stops, so neither copy is lost or merged.
tests/frame/check_app_data.py launches the Notes demo on the nested
desktop with notes in the earlier location and checks that they arrive
byte for byte (including a literal backslash sequence and non-ASCII
text), that the old directory is gone, that the new one is 0700 and that
a second copy makes the next launch fail with 409 without changing
either. The weft-pack tests that change the environment now share a lock.
Add AGENTS.md as the single engineering contract: sources of truth,
evidence and proof requirements, ownership, working modes, the reviewed
change loop, maintenance isolation, decision authority, dependency and
fork rules, the 0.0.x to 0.1.0 release progression, and branch and
publication rules.
Add .agents/ with scope, implement, verify, maintenance and release
procedures; reviewer, architecture debt scout, simplicity and refactoring
roles; skills for the compositor, Servo rendering, runtime capabilities,
appd sessions, packages and data, Linux deployment, integration
verification and documentation; and verify.py, which runs the existing
check profiles with --locked from any directory, stops on the first
failure and supports --dry-run.
check_toolkit.py validates local links and heading anchors, metadata,
catalog coverage and issue forms. A new contributor-toolkit CI job runs
both. The structure follows the Resina Design System toolkit at
1e768064f57a1e403ab271822383e732795905a6, adapted to WEFT.
Validation, against the committed lockfiles:
- verify.py toolkit: checker passes, 28 runner/checker tests pass
- verify.py portable, demos, packages: pass
- verify.py linux, runtime, servo-embed: fail on existing defects
(clippy collapsible_if in the winit backend, three clippy lints in
weft-runtime with wasmtime-runtime, and an E0308 in the selected Servo
revision's servo-layout); the runner reports the failing status
Add CONTRIBUTING.md, issue forms for defects and changes, maintenance
problems and decisions of direction, and a pull request template asking
for ownership, proof and the validation actually performed. README.md
links the contribution guide.
A component with a host-specific fetch grant could reach another origin
by setting its own Host header, and could inject request lines through
the method string, which ureq writes unvalidated. Fetch now accepts only
standard methods and refuses Host, framing and hop-by-hop headers. Fetch
grants accept canonical DNS names and dotted IPv4 addresses only, so a
grant can never be written in a form that silently never matches.
--preopen split host and guest at the first `::`, so a host path
containing `::` widened the preopened directory; it now splits from the
right, and appd refuses host paths that are not UTF-8 or contain `::`.
appd validated capabilities one at a time, creating the data directory
before a later capability was refused, and required HOME even for
packages without filesystem capabilities. It now checks every capability
first, resolves host directories only when needed, validates the app ID
with the rule weft-pack uses (now shared in weft_ipc_types::package), and
reports 400, 404, 403 or 500 according to the cause. user-dirs.dirs is
read as a shell would: the last assignment wins, $HOME must be followed
by a slash, escaped values are ignored and a relative XDG_CONFIG_HOME is
not used.
The grants probe now also overwrites, renames, removes and creates
directories in read-only data, and sends a forged Host header, an
injected method and a file: URL; it fails when directory permissions of
a read-only preopen are widened or the header check is removed. A new
CI job builds the runtime with its engine and fetch support and runs the
check. The mount test that sets WEFT_APP_STORE now holds the env lock.
Package images are still located separately from directory installs;
deriving grants from the verified image is part of resolving one package
descriptor.
WEFT OS targets Linux and systemd. The Windows runner only compiled and
tested the crates without Linux system libraries, which says nothing
about a supported configuration, and was the slowest job in every run.
The job is now `portable` on Ubuntu, matching the verification profile
of the same name. The building guide, README and development
environment notes now state that builds are validated on Linux only.
Every host import was registered and callable whatever the package
declared, read-only directory capabilities were preopened read-write,
and appd launched packages whose capabilities it could not satisfy. The
fetch import also could not be linked: the host returned a tuple where
the WIT declares the response record, so any component importing
weft:app/fetch failed to instantiate.
One capability vocabulary now lives in weft_ipc_types::capability and
is used by weft-pack, weft-appd and weft-runtime. weft-appd derives a
session's grants once, before the session exists, and refuses the launch
with error 403 when a capability is unknown, unsupported (hw:gpu:*) or
unsatisfiable (documents without an XDG documents directory). The
documents directory now comes from user-dirs.dirs instead of a guessed
~/Documents.
The runtime receives grants explicitly (--grant CAP, --preopen
HOST::GUEST::ro|rw), preopens read-only directories read-only, and checks
the grant on every notifications, clipboard and fetch call. Fetch accepts
only http and https to granted hosts, returns redirects and HTTP error
statuses as responses instead of following or failing them, and bounds
connect time, total time and response size. The file portal takes
read-only directories with --allow-read and refuses writes there.
tests/runtime/check_grants.py runs the real runtime on a probe component
under each kind of grant and checks the outcome of every operation; it
fails when read-only data is writable or an import ignores its grant.
The appd dispatch tests that read WEFT_RUNTIME_BIN now hold the env lock
shared with the tests that set it.