WEFT_OS/docs
Marco Allegretti 88c2e9f6a5
fix(pack): install only trusted packages and bind each app ID to its owner
weft-pack install copied any package into the store: signatures were
never checked, no key was trusted for anything, any publisher could
install over another's app ID and reach its retained data, and the
signing inventory followed symbolic links, so a package could sign and
install files from outside itself.

Installation now requires a signature by a key in the trust store
($XDG_CONFIG_HOME/weft/trusted-keys and /etc/weft/trusted-keys, or
$WEFT_TRUSTED_KEYS alone). Unsigned or untrusted content installs only
with --dev, recorded as development content. The package is copied
into the store, checked and verified on that copy, and renamed into
place, so the verified bytes are the installed bytes.

The first installation of an app ID records its owner beside the app
data; later installations must have the same owner, so neither another
publisher nor a development build can take the ID over. The record
outlives uninstall while app data remains.

The content digest moves to weft_ipc_types::trust and refuses links,
special files and non-UTF-8 paths; it keeps the existing inventory
format, and both committed demo signatures still verify. Catalogs list
only directories named after their package ID. The security guide
described a signature over wapp.toml and app.wasm only; it now
describes the full inventory and the trust and ownership rules.
2026-10-09 13:49:49 +00:00
..
upstream Add WEFT architecture and interface design documents 2026-03-10 18:47:10 +01:00
architecture.md fix(pack): install only trusted packages and bind each app ID to its owner 2026-10-09 13:49:49 +00:00
building.md fix(pack): install only trusted packages and bind each app ID to its owner 2026-10-09 13:49:49 +00:00
security.md fix(pack): install only trusted packages and bind each app ID to its owner 2026-10-09 13:49:49 +00:00