Unmapping a closed window made a session with no mapped window count
as new again, so destroying and recreating its only window took
keyboard focus from the application the user had activated. The
compositor now remembers which sessions already received focus on map
until the session ends.
When the focused window closed, keys went to a dead surface until the
next click; the topmost remaining application window, or the panel,
now gets focus. Only a session's first window takes focus when it
maps, so a client cannot take keystrokes meant for another application
by creating windows. A panel is fitted and kept beneath however the
shell orders its requests, and focusing the panel clears the
applications' activated state. ACTIVATE_APP is refused while the
compositor is not connected rather than queued.
check_activation.py now also ends the focused application and checks
that keys reach the remaining one.
The system shell's panel was an ordinary toplevel at winit's default
size, stacked by map order with the applications, and clicking or the
taskbar could never bring an application back to the front.
The compositor now sizes the panel to the output and keeps it beneath
every application window. A newly mapped, clicked or activated
application window is raised, marked activated and given keyboard
focus. weft-appd accepts ACTIVATE_APP for a running session and asks
the compositor to activate that session's window (AppFocusRequest),
and the system UI's taskbar entries send it when chosen.
check_activation.py runs the system shell with a solid panel page and
two test applications: the panel fills the output beneath them, each
launch comes to the front with keyboard focus, ACTIVATE_APP switches
between the sessions with focus, and activating a session that is not
running is refused.
The session file is read and removed at startup, and restoring now runs
in its own task, so a shutdown during the restore would have saved only
the apps launched so far. Until the restore finishes, a shutdown stops
it and saves the restored list unchanged.
Frames queued for a slow appd were sent only on later traffic, so the
end of a burst could wait indefinitely. A timer now retries the flush
every 20 ms, armed only while frames are queued. weft-appd restores the
previous session in its own task, so waiting for the compositor no
longer delays clients or shutdown, and the security docs describe the
launch refusal and the backlog limit exactly.
A full socket buffer toward a stalled appd closed the connection and
with it every app. Frames for appd are now queued whole and flushed on
each send and read, and only a backlog beyond the frame limit or a
write error ends the connection. A disconnect report is applied only
when it comes from the session's current client, so a client closed
with an earlier appd cannot remove the mapping of a new session that
reused its ID. A failure to watch a new appd connection no longer
leaves the compositor refusing every later one.
weft-appd refuses a launch with 503 before anything starts while the
compositor is not connected, and waits up to 10 s for the connection
before restoring the previous session.
Session clients could still create layer-shell surfaces, including
full-screen overlays with exclusive keyboard input, and bind the input
method, which bypassed the refusal of shell roles. Both globals are now
hidden from clients bound to a session.
The compositor IPC connection is tracked by its read source, so a write
error can no longer let a second peer feed the same buffers; a failed
write shuts the connection down. An undecodable or oversized frame ends
the connection, since descriptors could otherwise pair with the wrong
messages, and the descriptor limit counts only descriptors no message
claims, so a burst of launches is not taken for abuse. When appd's
connection ends, the compositor closes the clients of the sessions it
attached.
weft-appd notices when the compositor closes the connection, resends a
message whose write failed after reconnecting, and refuses a launch
while the compositor is not connected instead of starting an app shell
that can never connect.
The compositor stored appd's (pid, session) announcements and never used
them, so no surface could be attributed to a session and any client
could claim any app ID or the panel role.
weft-appd now creates a connected socket pair for each session, gives
the app shell one end as standard input with WAYLAND_SOCKET=0 and no
WAYLAND_DISPLAY, and sends the other end to the compositor with the
session and app ID over the compositor IPC socket (SCM_RIGHTS). The
compositor inserts it as a client bound to that session: holding the
connection is the session's identity. A session's zweft_shell windows
carry its app ID, the panel and overlay roles are refused to sessions
with a new role_not_permitted error, the session's first toplevel is
reported to appd, an ended session's client is closed, and a client's
disconnection is reported. The compositor accepts one appd connection
at a time.
The counter desktop check now requires the compositor to bind the app's
client to its session and to close it when the session is terminated.
Claiming data does not depend on finding earlier-layout data, so an
install that claims it no longer needs HOME. Tests cover a first launch
and a first install with an unusable HOME refusing and recording no
owner, and the security docs state the HOME requirement.
Without an absolute HOME the earlier data layout could not be checked,
so a first-launch or install owner record was written anyway and that
data was migrated to the new owner later. Both now refuse instead.
Uninstall keeps an owner record while data exists in either layout, or
while it cannot tell. Launch tests use a private HOME, and the test
data-home cleanup never removes the running process's own.
App data in the earlier layout, <home>/.local/share/weft/apps/<id>/data,
is migrated to the app data directory after the owner check, so a
trusted package from another store could be recorded as owner on its
first launch and then receive that data. Both layouts now count as
existing data, in weft-appd and in weft-pack install, so unowned data
is only given away with --claim-data. The refusal says how to claim
it. Stale test data homes are removed only when their process has
exited, and the app-data check records the owner of the data it seeds.
The manifest is now read once, and its bytes must match the verified
inventory, so a manifest swapped in around the check cannot grant
capabilities or entries the owner did not sign. A trusted package with
no owner record is recorded as its signer's on its first launch, and
app data without a recorded owner is refused rather than handed to the
first publisher, matching weft-pack's --claim-data rule. A damaged
trust store or owner record is a host error (500), and the trust store
is not consulted for development content.
Supervisor tests use a private data home and an empty trust store; the
counter check runs with a private home, and the notes check records
the owner of the data it seeds.
weft-appd trusted an installed directory as installed, so content
changed after installation, or signed by a key since removed from the
trust store, still ran with the owner's app data. Before anything
starts, a package recorded as a publisher's must carry that
publisher's valid signature over its current content, with the key
still trusted; a package with no record must be signed by a trusted
key; development content, recorded by weft-pack install --dev, runs
unverified. Failures are refused with code 403.
The desktop checks trust the demo key, and the confinement check,
whose package deliberately holds a link, records it as development
content.
A relative store none of whose components existed failed, because the
empty ancestor was treated as a directory to create. New store
directories are now created private and set to 0755 through a
descriptor opened without following links, so a swapped path cannot
redirect the mode change. The security docs state the hard-link
protection as the kernel enforces it.
A first root install under a restrictive umask created the store and its
parents unreadable to other users even though the package inside was
0755/0644. Missing store directories are now created and set to 0755.
The copy comment and the hard-link note in the security docs describe
exactly what is checked and what the kernel enforces.
Modes requested at creation were masked by the umask, so a root install
under umask 077 produced system packages other users could not read.
They are now set explicitly after creation. The copy reads each
directory's names and closes the listing before recursing, so deep
trees hold one descriptor per level. The owner-lock test now uses an
ID that would otherwise open, and the docs describe the copy check and
its device-node residual precisely.
Checking each file's device and inode against a path-based listing still
followed a directory replaced by a link after it was listed. The copy now
holds each source directory open and opens its entries relative to it
with O_NOFOLLOW, checking type, device and inode against the listing.
Only real packages in other stores keep an owner record, the store list
is deduplicated, archive names must be valid app IDs, and the help text
is wrapped.
The app ID now comes from the staged copy, so a source changed after
validation cannot steer paths outside the store or the owners directory,
and lock_owner refuses invalid IDs. Copied files must keep the device and
inode they were listed with, and are opened without following links or
blocking on FIFOs, which no longer depends on /proc. Uninstall keeps an
owner record while another known store holds the package, and a failure
to inspect app data refuses rather than counting as no data.
Names with control characters have no content digest, so a crafted name
can no longer reproduce other inventory lines and drop signed files.
Installs and uninstalls of an ID hold a per-ID lock, so a failed
concurrent install cannot remove the record of the one that won. App
data without a recorded owner goes to a new owner only with
--claim-data. Uninstall releases a record left by an interrupted
install once no data remains. Files are opened without following links
and, on Linux, must be the file that was listed.
Installed files take fixed modes (0644, or 0755 when executable) and
directories 0755, so a world-writable source cannot install as such.
An owner record created by an installation whose package then fails to
be placed is removed, and records are written under a temporary name
and linked into place, so they are never partial. Archives unpack into
a random private directory that is always removed. Uninstall frees an
ID only when the app data is truly absent, signatures are checked with
verify_strict, and list marks development installs.
weft-pack install copied any package into the store: signatures were
never checked, no key was trusted for anything, any publisher could
install over another's app ID and reach its retained data, and the
signing inventory followed symbolic links, so a package could sign and
install files from outside itself.
Installation now requires a signature by a key in the trust store
($XDG_CONFIG_HOME/weft/trusted-keys and /etc/weft/trusted-keys, or
$WEFT_TRUSTED_KEYS alone). Unsigned or untrusted content installs only
with --dev, recorded as development content. The package is copied
into the store, checked and verified on that copy, and renamed into
place, so the verified bytes are the installed bytes.
The first installation of an app ID records its owner beside the app
data; later installations must have the same owner, so neither another
publisher nor a development build can take the ID over. The record
outlives uninstall while app data remains.
The content digest moves to weft_ipc_types::trust and refuses links,
special files and non-UTF-8 paths; it keeps the existing inventory
format, and both committed demo signatures still verify. Catalogs list
only directories named after their package ID. The security guide
described a signature over wapp.toml and app.wasm only; it now
describes the full inventory and the trust and ownership rules.
- A verified image in any store now takes precedence over a directory
install in any store, so a user's directory cannot shadow a system
image of the same app.
- The package root must be a directory and wapp.toml a regular file,
not links to content outside the root the entries are checked in.
- Incomplete or malformed image metadata is refused with 403; a
missing helper, a failed mount or an unreadable manifest with 500.
- A supervisor test records the arguments of both children and
requires the resolved component and UI document.
The documentation states that the root hash is read from the store
and not yet authenticated.
The runtime, the app shell and grant derivation each searched the
package stores and parsed wapp.toml on their own, so they could use
different roots; the runtime ignored [runtime].module, the image loader
looked for companion files the builder never wrote, and a failed image
mount fell back to the mutable directory install.
weft-appd now resolves a launch once: a verified image wins over a
directory in the same store, and when any image file exists the image
must mount or the launch is refused. The manifest must declare the
requested ID, and both entries must be plain relative paths to regular
files without links. The runtime receives --module and the app shell
--ui; neither looks for the package. Grants come from the same
manifest, and the mount belongs to the session.
The manifest parser and the image file names move to weft-ipc-types,
shared with weft-pack, whose check now applies the same entry rules.
Mapper devices are named after their per-launch mountpoint, so
concurrent sessions no longer collide.
Review of the renderer policy found loads it did not see or judged
wrongly:
- Loads Servo does not attribute to the webview, such as
navigator.sendBeacon(), reached the network. They are all refused.
- On a redirect Servo reports the first URL again, so every redirect
is refused.
- A symbolic link inside the UI directory led anywhere on disk; file
loads are checked again after resolving links.
- Only about:blank is allowed among about: URLs.
The Servo pin moves to 5d90f51, which keeps compiled classic scripts
rooted until they run (a parser-blocking script waiting for a failed
stylesheet import crashed the content process) and withholds
navigator.servo from about:blank and about:srcdoc documents.
The confinement check gains probes for links, workers, beacons,
imports, fonts and srcdoc frames, and its WebSocket server completes
the handshake. The slow stylesheet's delay now starts when the host
first tries to open it.
An application page could load any local file through file: URLs and
reach any network destination with images, fetch, XHR or WebSockets,
bypassing the component's fetch grants. The shell now checks every
resource load: files inside the UI directory, inline data:, blob: and
about: resources and the session bridge are allowed; anything else
fails with a network error before a request leaves the renderer.
tests/frame/check_confinement.py probes each path on the nested desktop
and requires that no HTTP request or TCP connection reaches the host.
The frame check's slow stylesheet becomes a file next to the page held
back with a file lease, so it stays inside the confined scope.
IPC_FORWARD held the registry lock while awaiting a send to the
component; with a full queue it stalled appd, and once the relay was
closed it locked the registry again and deadlocked. It now sends without
waiting and reports an error when the session has no relay or its queue
is full.
A relay whose component disconnected left the session running with no
way to exchange messages. The session now stops when its IPC connection
closes. The relay releases its task and socket when dropped, so a
cancelled supervisor leaks neither, and the socket is created with mode
0600.
New tests fail against the previous code: IPC_FORWARD against a missing
relay and a full queue must answer at once, and a runtime that closes
its IPC connection while still running must end its session. The test
runtime directory lives under target/ instead of one directory per run.
dispatch opened each session's IPC socket and registered its sender
before the supervisor existed, and nothing released them: a relay whose
runtime never connected waited forever with its socket file in place,
and every stopped session left its sender registered, so app messages
for it were still accepted and queued.
The supervisor now opens the relay after its early checks, and the
session owns it: every exit path stops the relay task, removes the
socket and unregisters the sender. A session whose socket cannot be
opened does not start. The relay accepts a single connection.
A dispatch-level test launches a package whose runtime reports ready
and exits without connecting; it requires the stopped session to leave
no sender and no socket, and fails against the previous code. The
Counter and Notes checks pass end to end.
weft-pack uninstall moved earlier app data only when the package
manifest could be read and declared an app-data capability, and only
when the store path was spelled exactly as the user store; otherwise it
removed the package directory with the data in it. A directory left
holding only data by an earlier weft-appd, which has no manifest, was
deleted that way.
A data directory is now never removed with a package. In the user
store, recognised by its real location rather than its spelling, it is
moved when the package declares app data or its manifest cannot be
read; in every other case uninstall stops and changes nothing. Tests
cover a directory holding only data, a store reached through '..', a
symbolically linked home, an app without the capability and another
store.
weft-appd reports both locations when a move fails with an I/O error and
creates the data directory with mode 0700 instead of tightening it
afterwards.
The editor accepted typing before the stored notes had loaded, and a
load reply then adopted the stored revision for text edited from
nothing, so a save replaced notes the user never saw; the same happened
when typing during a Discard reload. The editor is now read-only until
it holds the stored text.
Two Notes windows saving at once shared one staging file and could each
pass the revision check, storing a mix of both texts. Each save now
holds a lock file while it checks the revision and replaces the notes,
writes its own staging file, syncs it before the rename, and removes
only that file on failure; a lock left by an ended session expires
after ten seconds.
A save larger than the 64 KiB app message limit after JSON encoding was
dropped on its way and left the page waiting forever with Save
disabled. The page now refuses such saves before sending, gives up on a
save after ten seconds without a reply, and the component answers every
request, including malformed ones, so no request goes unanswered.
check_notes.py now pauses weft-runtime with SIGSTOP to make text typed
during a save and keys typed during a Discard reload deterministic; the
previous package fails it by saving text typed before the reload. The
building guide lists the application checks, the pinned toolchain for
reproducing the demo binaries and the demo key path.
weft-pack treated any top-level data directory in a package as app
data from the earlier layout, in every store and for every app: a
package shipping data/ lost that content to the app data directory on
uninstall and could then no longer be uninstalled. Data is now moved
only from ~/.local/share/weft/apps/<id>/data, the only place earlier
versions wrote it, and only for packages declaring an app-data
capability; packages may no longer contain a top-level data entry.
The move left an empty package directory behind, which then blocked
weft-pack install although nothing was listed; an emptied package
directory is now removed, and install accepts an empty leftover. The
rename uses RENAME_NOREPLACE, so a target created after the check is
reported as a conflict instead of being replaced, and a move across
filesystems is refused with a message naming both locations instead of
a bare OS error. Directories moved by weft-pack are made private too,
and a symbolic link at the target is refused rather than followed.
The system UI now shows launch refusals, which it only logged, and the
weft-appd unit may write under ~/.local/share/weft, which
ProtectSystem=strict made read-only. check_app_data.py also types into
Notes after the move and requires the save to reach the moved file, and
checks that no empty package directory remains.
The Notes demo exchanged hand-escaped strings: the page turned every
literal backslash-n into a line break on load and save, the component
escaped only some control characters, so other text produced invalid
replies, and every reply replaced the editor contents, discarding text
typed while a save was in flight. Saves wrote the file in place and
replaced whatever another Notes window had stored.
Requests and replies are now JSON objects. The component reports a
revision (a hash of the stored bytes) with each load; a save names the
revision it was edited from and is refused when the stored notes have
changed since, so a second window's text is never replaced silently. The
file is written beside notes.txt and renamed over it. A save
acknowledgement updates only the saved state, never the editor, and
Discard reloads the stored notes.
tests/frame/check_notes.py edits Notes with real keyboard input on the
nested desktop: text with a literal backslash sequence, quotes, a tab and
non-ASCII characters is stored byte for byte, text typed during a save
survives, and a save after another window changed the file is refused.
It fails against the previous package, which turned the seeded "\n"
into a line break. app.wasm is rebuilt and the package re-signed with the
demo key.
App data lived in ~/.local/share/weft/apps/<id>/data, inside the user
package store under the installed package directory. Uninstalling a
package deleted its data, and launching a package installed elsewhere
created that directory, after which installing the package for the user
failed because its directory already existed.
App data now lives in $XDG_DATA_HOME/weft/app-data/<id>, one shared
rule in weft_ipc_types::package, and is made private (0700) on every
launch. Data in the earlier location is moved there in one rename on the
first launch with an app-data capability, and by weft-pack before it
uninstalls a package or installs over a directory holding only data. If
both locations hold data, nothing is moved: the launch is refused with
409 and weft-pack stops, so neither copy is lost or merged.
tests/frame/check_app_data.py launches the Notes demo on the nested
desktop with notes in the earlier location and checks that they arrive
byte for byte (including a literal backslash sequence and non-ASCII
text), that the old directory is gone, that the new one is 0700 and that
a second copy makes the next launch fail with 409 without changing
either. The weft-pack tests that change the environment now share a lock.
Add AGENTS.md as the single engineering contract: sources of truth,
evidence and proof requirements, ownership, working modes, the reviewed
change loop, maintenance isolation, decision authority, dependency and
fork rules, the 0.0.x to 0.1.0 release progression, and branch and
publication rules.
Add .agents/ with scope, implement, verify, maintenance and release
procedures; reviewer, architecture debt scout, simplicity and refactoring
roles; skills for the compositor, Servo rendering, runtime capabilities,
appd sessions, packages and data, Linux deployment, integration
verification and documentation; and verify.py, which runs the existing
check profiles with --locked from any directory, stops on the first
failure and supports --dry-run.
check_toolkit.py validates local links and heading anchors, metadata,
catalog coverage and issue forms. A new contributor-toolkit CI job runs
both. The structure follows the Resina Design System toolkit at
1e768064f57a1e403ab271822383e732795905a6, adapted to WEFT.
Validation, against the committed lockfiles:
- verify.py toolkit: checker passes, 28 runner/checker tests pass
- verify.py portable, demos, packages: pass
- verify.py linux, runtime, servo-embed: fail on existing defects
(clippy collapsible_if in the winit backend, three clippy lints in
weft-runtime with wasmtime-runtime, and an E0308 in the selected Servo
revision's servo-layout); the runner reports the failing status
Add CONTRIBUTING.md, issue forms for defects and changes, maintenance
problems and decisions of direction, and a pull request template asking
for ownership, proof and the validation actually performed. README.md
links the contribution guide.
A component with a host-specific fetch grant could reach another origin
by setting its own Host header, and could inject request lines through
the method string, which ureq writes unvalidated. Fetch now accepts only
standard methods and refuses Host, framing and hop-by-hop headers. Fetch
grants accept canonical DNS names and dotted IPv4 addresses only, so a
grant can never be written in a form that silently never matches.
--preopen split host and guest at the first `::`, so a host path
containing `::` widened the preopened directory; it now splits from the
right, and appd refuses host paths that are not UTF-8 or contain `::`.
appd validated capabilities one at a time, creating the data directory
before a later capability was refused, and required HOME even for
packages without filesystem capabilities. It now checks every capability
first, resolves host directories only when needed, validates the app ID
with the rule weft-pack uses (now shared in weft_ipc_types::package), and
reports 400, 404, 403 or 500 according to the cause. user-dirs.dirs is
read as a shell would: the last assignment wins, $HOME must be followed
by a slash, escaped values are ignored and a relative XDG_CONFIG_HOME is
not used.
The grants probe now also overwrites, renames, removes and creates
directories in read-only data, and sends a forged Host header, an
injected method and a file: URL; it fails when directory permissions of
a read-only preopen are widened or the header check is removed. A new
CI job builds the runtime with its engine and fetch support and runs the
check. The mount test that sets WEFT_APP_STORE now holds the env lock.
Package images are still located separately from directory installs;
deriving grants from the verified image is part of resolving one package
descriptor.
WEFT OS targets Linux and systemd. The Windows runner only compiled and
tested the crates without Linux system libraries, which says nothing
about a supported configuration, and was the slowest job in every run.
The job is now `portable` on Ubuntu, matching the verification profile
of the same name. The building guide, README and development
environment notes now state that builds are validated on Linux only.
Every host import was registered and callable whatever the package
declared, read-only directory capabilities were preopened read-write,
and appd launched packages whose capabilities it could not satisfy. The
fetch import also could not be linked: the host returned a tuple where
the WIT declares the response record, so any component importing
weft:app/fetch failed to instantiate.
One capability vocabulary now lives in weft_ipc_types::capability and
is used by weft-pack, weft-appd and weft-runtime. weft-appd derives a
session's grants once, before the session exists, and refuses the launch
with error 403 when a capability is unknown, unsupported (hw:gpu:*) or
unsatisfiable (documents without an XDG documents directory). The
documents directory now comes from user-dirs.dirs instead of a guessed
~/Documents.
The runtime receives grants explicitly (--grant CAP, --preopen
HOST::GUEST::ro|rw), preopens read-only directories read-only, and checks
the grant on every notifications, clipboard and fetch call. Fetch accepts
only http and https to granted hosts, returns redirects and HTTP error
statuses as responses instead of following or failing them, and bounds
connect time, total time and response size. The file portal takes
read-only directories with --allow-read and refuses writes there.
tests/runtime/check_grants.py runs the real runtime on a probe component
under each kind of grant and checks the outcome of every operation; it
fails when read-only data is writable or an import ignores its grant.
The appd dispatch tests that read WEFT_RUNTIME_BIN now hold the env lock
shared with the tests that set it.
A file URL whose path holds an encoded slash or backslash keeps the UI
directory prefix while a loader may decode it into a path outside that
directory. Navigation and the bridge now refuse such URLs.
appd removes the system token file at shutdown only while it still holds
its own token, and the HELLO deadline in unit tests is one second.
The browser-facing WebSocket accepted requests from any local page, so a
page could launch or terminate apps and inject messages into any session.
Every connection now completes the upgrade and sends HELLO within five
seconds. The system role authenticates with a token appd writes to
$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/weft/appd.systoken (mode 0600) and may manage sessions,
but never sees or sends application messages. The app role authenticates
with a per-session bridge token passed to weft-app-shell in
WEFT_BRIDGE_TOKEN and exchanges APP_MESSAGE envelopes with its own
session only; it is disconnected when that session stops.
weft-servo-shell hands the system endpoint only to the system UI
document and denies navigation away from it. weft-app-shell installs the
bridge only in top-level documents inside the application's UI
directory and denies navigation outside it. The launcher renders package
names as text.
tests/frame/check_counter.py drives the Counter demo end to end through
the compositor, appd, the Wasm runtime and the app shell.
weft-appd marked a session Running and broadcast APP_READY as soon as the
runtime printed READY, then started weft-app-shell with its output
discarded and never watched it. A session with no UI, a UI host that
failed to start, or one that crashed was still reported running. Early
failure paths skipped parts of the cleanup: the image mount was not
unmounted, the compositor association was not released, and the abort
sender leaked on spawn failure. Readiness was any stdout line equal to
READY, which a Wasm guest (inherited stdout) or a page (window.alert
writes to the app shell's stdout) could print.
Now a session becomes Running only after the runtime and then the app
shell report readiness, each within 30 s; WEFT_APP_SHELL_BIN is required
and checked before anything starts. After that, the runtime exiting, the
app shell exiting or a terminate request ends the session. Every exit
path goes through one teardown that kills both children, releases the
compositor association, unmounts the image, stops the file portal and
broadcasts Stopped.
Readiness uses a per-session random token passed to both children in
WEFT_READY_TOKEN. weft-runtime and weft-app-shell print READY <token>,
and appd accepts only a line ending with it; guests receive only the
variables the runtime names and pages cannot read the host environment.
Child output is read in bounded, lossily decoded lines, so invalid UTF-8
or long lines no longer stop the readers. Compositor notifications use
try_send so a disconnected compositor cannot stall teardown, and all
children are killed if the supervisor is dropped.
The IPC relay is not yet owned by the session, and children are killed
without a graceful period.
Validation:
- cargo test -p weft-appd (43 passed); new tests cover: not ready until
the app shell is ready, runtime exit before that, no app shell
configured (runtime never starts), app shell exit ending a running
session with the runtime process gone, and READY lines without the
token; they fail against the previous supervisor
- end to end with weft-compositor (nested), weft-appd, weft-runtime
(wasmtime-runtime) and weft-app-shell: the Counter demo reaches
APP_READY and is on screen; a page that prints a READY line through
alert and never loads is stopped after 30 s without APP_READY;
terminate leaves no child processes
- clippy -D warnings and fmt --check for weft-appd and weft-runtime
Nothing checked that input reaches a page through the compositor; the
Servo hosts' input forwarding had only been compiled.
tests/frame/check_input.py runs weft-servo-shell with
tests/frame/input.html on the nested desktop and injects real X input
with xdotool into weft-compositor's window. The compositor's winit backend
routes it through its seat to the Wayland client, which has no X display.
The page must react in its presented pixels: clicks 6 px either side of
the boundary between its halves change only the half under the pointer,
and the a and Shift+a key presses arrive with the right key value and
modifier. The harness gives the compositor's X window input focus, as a
window manager would; the client's keyboard focus comes from the
compositor's click-to-focus.
The nested desktop setup shared with check_frame.py moves to
tests/frame/session.py. Xvfb now reports the display it picked through
-displayfd, so concurrent runs cannot share an X server, and a run clears
only the logs and capture it writes.
Validation:
- check_input.py: 3 of 3 runs pass; two concurrent runs pass
- negative pages fail: no script; left click handled by the right half;
an element extending the left half 20 px across the boundary; a key
handler ignoring Shift
- check_frame.py --host system, --host app, --host app --slow-style 3 pass
after the refactor
- unverified: key release and repeat, pointer motion and button release
events, wheel, focus loss, non-US layouts, non-ASCII text, scale changes,
weft-app-shell input
With servo-embed, weft-servo-shell and weft-app-shell did not compile
against the selected Servo revision: the keyboard event shape, key and
mouse action variants, frame readback, shutdown, URL type and window
handle APIs had changed. The frame path never called WebView::paint; the
software path rebuilt its softbuffer surface every frame and read pixels
without painting, and the EGL path presented nothing. weft-app-shell
printed READY right after creating its WebView, before any frame, and its
feature-disabled build printed READY and parked. Servo also disables CSS
Grid by default, which the system UI uses.
Both hosts now build against the selected API. Each frame is painted with
WebView::paint and presented: the software path reads the painted frame
back, presents the context and copies it into a persistent softbuffer
surface; the EGL path presents its window context. Nothing is presented
before Servo's first repaint request. Shutdown drops the WebView and
Servo, whose drop completes the shutdown, and exits the event loop. Both
hosts enable layout_grid_enabled.
weft-app-shell prints READY on the first frame presented after the
document has loaded and Servo reports its rendering settled: on load
completion it requests WebView::take_screenshot, which completes only once
every frame has fired load, render-blocking resources, images and web
fonts are done and the rendering is up to date. Feature-disabled builds of
both hosts exit with an error instead of reporting readiness. weft-appd
does not consume the app shell's READY yet.
tests/frame/check_frame.py runs weft-compositor nested on Xvfb with the
winit backend, starts a host showing tests/frame/reference.html and checks
the presented pixels (four colour quadrants and text). For the app host
the page must be on screen within two seconds of READY; --slow-style
delays a render-blocking stylesheet that reveals the page, so premature
readiness fails.
Validation (Ubuntu 24.04, Mesa 25.2.8 llvmpipe, software path):
- check_frame.py --host system, --host app and --host app --slow-style 3:
5 of 5 runs pass each
- negative fixtures fail: page with red and green swapped; a fake host
printing READY without rendering; a local build printing READY on its
first presented frame (--slow-style 4, 3 of 3)
- cargo clippy -D warnings with and without servo-embed; cargo fmt --check
- unverified: EGL path, DRM, resize, output scale, idle wakeup, input
Built without the wasmtime-runtime feature, weft-runtime printed READY
and exited without executing anything. weft-appd treats READY on the
runtime's stdout as the readiness signal, so such a build made a session
appear to start successfully although no component ran.
The feature-disabled build now exits with an error naming the missing
feature, so appd sees the runtime close without READY and stops the
session. The binary still builds for the portable type, lint and unit
checks. The Nix package keeps building the engine-enabled runtime.
Validation:
- new unit test: run_module in a feature-disabled build returns an error
naming the feature; it fails against the previous stub
- feature-disabled binary against a minimal package: exits 1 with the
error and prints no READY
- cargo test -p weft-runtime (5 passed), clippy -D warnings, fmt --check
Both Servo hosts tracked the marcoallegretti/servo `servo-weft` branch,
which the lockfile resolved to 8e7dc40. That revision's servo-layout does
not compile (E0308 and E0716 in build_backdrop_filter). WEFT also resolved
upstream Stylo dca3934, where backdrop-filter is gated behind
layout.unimplemented, because the Servo fork's own [patch] for Stylo does
not apply to dependents.
Pin Servo by revision to f0bb1aa (8e7dc40 plus the build fix) and add a
root [patch."https://github.com/servo/stylo"] selecting the
marcoallegretti/stylo fork at f1ba496 for all eight Stylo crates Servo
uses. Cargo.lock changes only the 66 source lines of those packages.
Record both pins, their reachable branches, purpose and removal
conditions in SERVO_PIN.md, and restate its limitations against executed
evidence. Update the Nix outputHashes: the Stylo hash is recomputed for
f1ba496 with the method that reproduces the previous dca3934 value; the
Servo hash is not yet known for f0bb1aa and is left as lib.fakeHash, so
Nix builds report the expected value instead of using a stale one.
Validation:
- cargo metadata --locked: ok; no servo/stylo sources remain in the lock
- cargo check -p weft-servo-shell --features servo-embed --locked:
all of Servo, including servo-layout, compiles; the remaining errors are
in the shell's own embedder code
- cargo fmt --check; portable workspace tests: 78 passed
- Nix fetchgit could not run here (archive downloads and the sandbox's
TLS to the proxy fail), so the Servo hash remains unverified
- Replace Mesa-libEGL-devel and Mesa-libGLES-devel (do not exist on
openSUSE) with libglvnd-devel (Khronos EGL/GLES dispatch headers)
- Replace libseat-devel (does not exist on openSUSE) with seatd-devel
Package names confirmed via rpmfind.net against Tumbleweed and Leap
repositories.
- flake.nix, infra/nixos/: NixOS VM with Mesa, virtio-gpu, Wayland,
systemd user services for compositor and session supervisor
- infra/vm/: QEMU build and run scripts
- .github/workflows/ci.yml: add Linux job to type-check weft-servo-shell
and weft-app-shell with --features servo-embed
- docs/architecture.md, docs/security.md, docs/building.md: replace
stale pre-implementation design documents
- README.md: rewrite to reflect current codebase
- crates/weft-servo-shell/SERVO_PIN.md: update implementation status and add
SpiderMonkey process boundary statement
Specifies the concrete steps needed to replace the current READY stub
with real Wasm module execution:
- Optional cargo feature gate (wasmtime-runtime) to keep default builds
fast; production service unit uses the feature-enabled binary.
- Engine + Module setup from wasm file path.
- WasiCtxBuilder with inherited stdout/stderr for READY signal passthrough.
- READY signal timing: Option A (print before _start) vs Option B
(explicit weft_ready() export); Option A is the initial implementation.
- Entry point: _start (standard wasm32-wasi target output).
- Error handling: module load failures, trap handling, missing _start.
- Explicit non-scope: host imports beyond WASI, memory caps, component
model, Wasm threads, fuel metering.
- Prerequisite: confirmed wasm32-wasi app SDK before integration.
Assesses the original concern that the weft-appd UI endpoint for the
system-ui.html page would require custom SpiderMonkey bindings injected
into Servo.
Conclusion: custom SpiderMonkey bindings are not required. Servo's
standard WebSocket API satisfies all UI endpoint requirements (send
requests, receive push notifications, structured JSON payloads).
Documents:
- What the UI endpoint needs (send/receive structured messages,
session-scoped, local transport).
- Servo's relevant capabilities: WebSocket implemented, fetch
implemented, custom embedder APIs not stable/not needed.
- Proposed implementation: tokio-tungstenite WebSocket listener in
weft-appd on 127.0.0.1; port published to XDG_RUNTIME_DIR for
discovery; broadcast channel for APP_READY push to all connected
clients; JSON framing (same Request/Response types via serde_json).
- Scope boundaries: does not replace the Unix socket path (servo-shell
native IPC); does not require Servo modification.
Includes winit Wayland input audit for servo-shell integration planning.
New files:
- crates/weft-servo-shell/: new workspace member
- Cargo.toml: anyhow + tracing deps; no servo dep yet (requires git
dependency on github.com/servo/servo with multi-minute build; deferred
until embedder contract is confirmed)
- src/main.rs: reads WAYLAND_DISPLAY and WEFT_SYSTEM_UI_HTML, locates
system-ui.html from packaged path, calls embed_servo() stub that
returns a descriptive error explaining the integration work remaining
- infra/shell/system-ui.html: system UI document per blueprint Section 5
DOM structure (weft-desktop, weft-wallpaper, weft-taskbar, weft-launcher,
weft-notification-center, weft-window); includes clock and launcher toggle
- infra/systemd/servo-shell.service: Requires+After weft-compositor.service,
Type=simple, Restart=on-failure
- docs/architecture/winit-wayland-audit.md: audit of winit 0.30.x Wayland
backend against WEFT input requirements; identifies keyboard shortcut
inhibit gap, touch gesture gap, IME incomplete (zwp_text_input_v3),
frame pacing absent (wp_presentation_time), DMA-BUF unverified;
none block initial integration; all tracked as pre-GA work items
Modified:
- Cargo.toml: add weft-servo-shell to workspace members
- scripts/wsl-check.sh: switch to --workspace for all three gates