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weft-pack install copied any package into the store: signatures were never checked, no key was trusted for anything, any publisher could install over another's app ID and reach its retained data, and the signing inventory followed symbolic links, so a package could sign and install files from outside itself. Installation now requires a signature by a key in the trust store ($XDG_CONFIG_HOME/weft/trusted-keys and /etc/weft/trusted-keys, or $WEFT_TRUSTED_KEYS alone). Unsigned or untrusted content installs only with --dev, recorded as development content. The package is copied into the store, checked and verified on that copy, and renamed into place, so the verified bytes are the installed bytes. The first installation of an app ID records its owner beside the app data; later installations must have the same owner, so neither another publisher nor a development build can take the ID over. The record outlives uninstall while app data remains. The content digest moves to weft_ipc_types::trust and refuses links, special files and non-UTF-8 paths; it keeps the existing inventory format, and both committed demo signatures still verify. Catalogs list only directories named after their package ID. The security guide described a signature over wapp.toml and app.wasm only; it now describes the full inventory and the trust and ownership rules. |
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| Cargo.toml | ||