# Security Model ## Principles WEFT OS enforces a capability-based security model. No capability is granted by default; all capabilities are declared in `wapp.toml` and verified before an app runs. ## Capability Verification `weft-pack check` validates capability strings against the shared vocabulary in `weft_ipc_types::capability`. Unknown capability strings are rejected. At launch, `weft-appd` derives the session's grants from the manifest and refuses to start a package with a capability that is unknown, unsupported or unsatisfiable. `weft-runtime` enforces the grants it is given: read-only directories are preopened read-only, and each host import checks its grant on every call. See the capability table in `architecture.md`. Installing a package does not yet ask the user to approve its capabilities; every declared, supported capability is granted at launch. ## Process Isolation Each app session runs as a separate OS process (`weft-runtime`). When systemd is available, the process is wrapped in a systemd scope (`weft-apps.slice`) with `CPUQuota=200%` and `MemoryMax=512M`. ## Filesystem Isolation Apps access the filesystem only through WASI preopened directories. Each capability maps to a specific host path preopened at a fixed guest path. The `weft-file-portal` process applies the same directory grants and access modes. It opens each granted directory once and resolves every request beneath that descriptor with `openat2(RESOLVE_BENEATH)`, so the kernel keeps the operation inside the directory: `..` and links pointing outside are refused, also when a link is swapped in while the operation runs; links that stay inside are followed. This needs Linux 5.6 or later; without `openat2` every operation fails. Requests must name an absolute path without `.`, `..` or empty components; files are limited to 16 MiB, listings to 10,000 entries, requests to one line of about 22 MiB, and the portal to 4 connections at a time, each closed when it sends or accepts no data for 60 seconds. Writes replace a file atomically, keeping its permission bits but not its owner, extended attributes or hard links (a write to a name that is a link replaces the link), and never create directories. A granted directory that cannot be opened when the portal starts is not served. Components cannot currently reach its socket, since the runtime grants them no socket access, and the socket's path is not passed to them. ## Package Signing Packages are signed with Ed25519 (`ed25519-dalek`). The signature covers the SHA-256 hash of `wapp.toml` and `app.wasm`. `weft-pack verify` checks the signature before installation. For verified read-only package storage, `weft-pack build-image` produces an EROFS image protected with dm-verity. Mounting requires the setuid `weft-mount-helper` which calls `veritysetup`. ## Seccomp `weft-runtime` supports an optional seccomp BPF filter (compiled in with `--features seccomp`). The filter blocks a set of dangerous syscalls: `ptrace`, `process_vm_readv`, `process_vm_writev`, `kexec_load`, `mount`, `umount2`, `setuid`, `setgid`, `chroot`, `pivot_root`, `init_module`, `finit_module`, `delete_module`, `bpf`, `perf_event_open`, `acct`. All other syscalls are allowed; the policy is permissive with a syscall blocklist, not a strict allowlist. ## Wayland Surface Isolation Each app registers its surface with the compositor via `zweft_shell_manager_v1`. The compositor enforces that each surface belongs to the session that created it. The app cannot render outside its assigned surface slot. ## JavaScript Engine (SpiderMonkey) The Servo embedding uses SpiderMonkey as its JavaScript engine. SpiderMonkey is a complex JIT compiler. The following are known limitations that are not mechanically addressed by WEFT OS at this time: - SpiderMonkey is not sandboxed at the OS level beyond what the Wasmtime/Servo process isolation provides. - JIT-compiled JavaScript runs with the same memory permissions as the rest of the Servo process. - SpiderMonkey vulnerabilities (CVE-class bugs in the JIT or parser) would affect the isolation boundary. **Current mitigation:** the `weft-app-shell` process runs as an unprivileged user with no ambient capabilities. The seccomp filter blocks the most dangerous privilege-escalation syscalls when enabled. WEFT does not claim stronger JavaScript engine isolation than Gecko/SpiderMonkey itself provides. **Not addressed:** JIT spraying, speculative execution attacks on SpiderMonkey's JIT output, and parser-level memory corruption bugs. These require either a Wasm-sandboxed JS engine or hardware-enforced control-flow integrity, neither of which is implemented. The bounded statement is: *WEFT OS relies on SpiderMonkey's own security properties for the JavaScript execution boundary. Any SpiderMonkey CVE that allows code execution within the renderer process is in-scope for the WEFT OS threat model.*