--- name: weft-runtime-capabilities description: Use for the Wasmtime runtime, WIT host imports, WASI preopens, effective grants, the file portal and seccomp. --- # Runtime, WASI and capabilities Owner: `weft-runtime` instantiates the component and enforces every host call; appd derives the effective grants once from the resolved package. Portals and host services act only on explicitly granted resources. Read the blueprint's [security and capability contract](../../../BLUEPRINT.md#5-security-and-capability-contract) and [component compatibility](../../../BLUEPRINT.md#42-manifest-and-component-compatibility). ## Where things live | Concern | Source | |---|---| | Engine setup, linker, host imports, preopens, seccomp | [weft-runtime main.rs](../../../crates/weft-runtime/src/main.rs) | | Host WIT (`weft:app@0.1.0`: notify, ipc, fetch, notifications, clipboard) | [weft-app.wit](../../../crates/weft-runtime/wit/weft-app.wit) | | Demo copies of the WIT | `examples/*/wit/deps/weft-app/weft-app.wit` | | Capability strings accepted at package check | `is_known_capability` and its `EXACT` list in [weft-pack](../../../crates/weft-pack/src/main.rs) | | Capability to preopen mapping at launch | [appd runtime.rs](../../../crates/weft-appd/src/runtime.rs) | | File portal | [weft-file-portal](../../../crates/weft-file-portal/src/main.rs) | ## Working rules - Features: `wasmtime-runtime` enables the engine, `net-fetch` the fetch import, `seccomp` the syscall blocklist. Without `wasmtime-runtime` the binary prints READY and exits; that path is a limited build fixture, never product evidence. - Verify Wasmtime and wasmtime-wasi behavior in the version `Cargo.lock` selects, including how the linker treats differing WIT patch versions. A textual version difference is not an ABI defect until an actual component shows it. - Every advertised import checks the effective grant on every call. Absent or unsupported operations fail explicitly; they are not successful no-ops. - Keep read-only and read/write access distinct through preopens and the portal. Confinement uses descriptor-relative or equivalent kernel-enforced operations; lexical prefix checks and `canonicalize()` followed by reopening are not sufficient against symlinks and replacement races. - Fetch needs explicit schemes, destinations, methods, deadlines, size limits and redirect authorization; keep HTTP errors distinct from transport errors. - Keep one canonical WIT source with a checked synchronization mechanism for its copies. - Do not describe the seccomp blocklist or process separation as complete confinement. ## Evidence `python .agents/scripts/verify.py portable runtime` covers the stub and the engine-enabled build, lints and unit tests. It does not instantiate a component. Host import behavior needs an actual component fixture for the allowed, denied and failure paths of each import; confinement needs traversal, symlink and race cases against the real portal and preopens. No profile or CI job compiles the `seccomp` feature; check it on Linux with `cargo clippy -p weft-runtime --features wasmtime-runtime,seccomp --all-targets --locked -- -D warnings` and prove filtering with a component or process fixture, not by compilation. Rebuild demo components with the `demos` profile when the WIT changes.