A relative store none of whose components existed failed, because the
empty ancestor was treated as a directory to create. New store
directories are now created private and set to 0755 through a
descriptor opened without following links, so a swapped path cannot
redirect the mode change. The security docs state the hard-link
protection as the kernel enforces it.
A first root install under a restrictive umask created the store and its
parents unreadable to other users even though the package inside was
0755/0644. Missing store directories are now created and set to 0755.
The copy comment and the hard-link note in the security docs describe
exactly what is checked and what the kernel enforces.
Modes requested at creation were masked by the umask, so a root install
under umask 077 produced system packages other users could not read.
They are now set explicitly after creation. The copy reads each
directory's names and closes the listing before recursing, so deep
trees hold one descriptor per level. The owner-lock test now uses an
ID that would otherwise open, and the docs describe the copy check and
its device-node residual precisely.
Checking each file's device and inode against a path-based listing still
followed a directory replaced by a link after it was listed. The copy now
holds each source directory open and opens its entries relative to it
with O_NOFOLLOW, checking type, device and inode against the listing.
Only real packages in other stores keep an owner record, the store list
is deduplicated, archive names must be valid app IDs, and the help text
is wrapped.
The app ID now comes from the staged copy, so a source changed after
validation cannot steer paths outside the store or the owners directory,
and lock_owner refuses invalid IDs. Copied files must keep the device and
inode they were listed with, and are opened without following links or
blocking on FIFOs, which no longer depends on /proc. Uninstall keeps an
owner record while another known store holds the package, and a failure
to inspect app data refuses rather than counting as no data.
Names with control characters have no content digest, so a crafted name
can no longer reproduce other inventory lines and drop signed files.
Installs and uninstalls of an ID hold a per-ID lock, so a failed
concurrent install cannot remove the record of the one that won. App
data without a recorded owner goes to a new owner only with
--claim-data. Uninstall releases a record left by an interrupted
install once no data remains. Files are opened without following links
and, on Linux, must be the file that was listed.
Installed files take fixed modes (0644, or 0755 when executable) and
directories 0755, so a world-writable source cannot install as such.
An owner record created by an installation whose package then fails to
be placed is removed, and records are written under a temporary name
and linked into place, so they are never partial. Archives unpack into
a random private directory that is always removed. Uninstall frees an
ID only when the app data is truly absent, signatures are checked with
verify_strict, and list marks development installs.
weft-pack install copied any package into the store: signatures were
never checked, no key was trusted for anything, any publisher could
install over another's app ID and reach its retained data, and the
signing inventory followed symbolic links, so a package could sign and
install files from outside itself.
Installation now requires a signature by a key in the trust store
($XDG_CONFIG_HOME/weft/trusted-keys and /etc/weft/trusted-keys, or
$WEFT_TRUSTED_KEYS alone). Unsigned or untrusted content installs only
with --dev, recorded as development content. The package is copied
into the store, checked and verified on that copy, and renamed into
place, so the verified bytes are the installed bytes.
The first installation of an app ID records its owner beside the app
data; later installations must have the same owner, so neither another
publisher nor a development build can take the ID over. The record
outlives uninstall while app data remains.
The content digest moves to weft_ipc_types::trust and refuses links,
special files and non-UTF-8 paths; it keeps the existing inventory
format, and both committed demo signatures still verify. Catalogs list
only directories named after their package ID. The security guide
described a signature over wapp.toml and app.wasm only; it now
describes the full inventory and the trust and ownership rules.
Every host import was registered and callable whatever the package
declared, read-only directory capabilities were preopened read-write,
and appd launched packages whose capabilities it could not satisfy. The
fetch import also could not be linked: the host returned a tuple where
the WIT declares the response record, so any component importing
weft:app/fetch failed to instantiate.
One capability vocabulary now lives in weft_ipc_types::capability and
is used by weft-pack, weft-appd and weft-runtime. weft-appd derives a
session's grants once, before the session exists, and refuses the launch
with error 403 when a capability is unknown, unsupported (hw:gpu:*) or
unsatisfiable (documents without an XDG documents directory). The
documents directory now comes from user-dirs.dirs instead of a guessed
~/Documents.
The runtime receives grants explicitly (--grant CAP, --preopen
HOST::GUEST::ro|rw), preopens read-only directories read-only, and checks
the grant on every notifications, clipboard and fetch call. Fetch accepts
only http and https to granted hosts, returns redirects and HTTP error
statuses as responses instead of following or failing them, and bounds
connect time, total time and response size. The file portal takes
read-only directories with --allow-read and refuses writes there.
tests/runtime/check_grants.py runs the real runtime on a probe component
under each kind of grant and checks the outcome of every operation; it
fails when read-only data is writable or an import ignores its grant.
The appd dispatch tests that read WEFT_RUNTIME_BIN now hold the env lock
shared with the tests that set it.
- flake.nix, infra/nixos/: NixOS VM with Mesa, virtio-gpu, Wayland,
systemd user services for compositor and session supervisor
- infra/vm/: QEMU build and run scripts
- .github/workflows/ci.yml: add Linux job to type-check weft-servo-shell
and weft-app-shell with --features servo-embed
- docs/architecture.md, docs/security.md, docs/building.md: replace
stale pre-implementation design documents
- README.md: rewrite to reflect current codebase
- crates/weft-servo-shell/SERVO_PIN.md: update implementation status and add
SpiderMonkey process boundary statement