With applications filling the work area, the system UI's launcher, drawn
in the panel beneath them, could not be seen while any application was
open. Clicking the panel now brings it to the front as the shell's home
until an application is activated again.
A panel that is destroyed, or whose client goes away, releases its
reserved strip and the applications are laid out again; dead panels no
longer count toward the work area, so a restarted shell does not reserve
the strip twice. A work area is never configured with a zero size. The
zweft_shell configure for an application window, at creation and in
reply to set_geometry, reports the work area the layout gives it, and a
panel's reports the output.
check_activation.py now clicks the taskbar strip, requires the panel to
cover both applications, and activates one back.
Application windows opened at the client's default size at the origin,
so one as large as the output hid the taskbar with no way back.
zweft_shell_window_v1 version 3 adds set_exclusive_zone: a panel
reserves a strip along an output edge, and other windows get the new
invalid_exclusive_zone error. weft-servo-shell reserves its 48-pixel
taskbar at the bottom (TASKBAR_HEIGHT, matching --taskbar-height in the
system UI). The compositor computes the work area as the output less the
reserved strips and configures every application window to fill it,
again when the output or a reservation changes.
The desktop harness now uses a 1400x900 X screen so the nested
compositor's whole 1280x800 output is captured. check_activation.py
requires both applications to fill the work area and end at the
reserved strip; check_notes.py finds the Discard button from the window's
right edge and check_confinement.py samples its probes from the measured
page instead of a fixed 800x600 window.
Servo refuses worker scripts for file: pages, blob: ones included, so
the worker probe now requires only that no worker fetch succeeds, and
the worker is built from the page itself. The srcdoc frame reports to a
listener installed before the frame exists. Band failures and requests
that reached the servers are reported together, so a run without the
policy shows every leak.
Review of the renderer policy found loads it did not see or judged
wrongly:
- Loads Servo does not attribute to the webview, such as
navigator.sendBeacon(), reached the network. They are all refused.
- On a redirect Servo reports the first URL again, so every redirect
is refused.
- A symbolic link inside the UI directory led anywhere on disk; file
loads are checked again after resolving links.
- Only about:blank is allowed among about: URLs.
The Servo pin moves to 5d90f51, which keeps compiled classic scripts
rooted until they run (a parser-blocking script waiting for a failed
stylesheet import crashed the content process) and withholds
navigator.servo from about:blank and about:srcdoc documents.
The confinement check gains probes for links, workers, beacons,
imports, fonts and srcdoc frames, and its WebSocket server completes
the handshake. The slow stylesheet's delay now starts when the host
first tries to open it.
An application page could load any local file through file: URLs and
reach any network destination with images, fetch, XHR or WebSockets,
bypassing the component's fetch grants. The shell now checks every
resource load: files inside the UI directory, inline data:, blob: and
about: resources and the session bridge are allowed; anything else
fails with a network error before a request leaves the renderer.
tests/frame/check_confinement.py probes each path on the nested desktop
and requires that no HTTP request or TCP connection reaches the host.
The frame check's slow stylesheet becomes a file next to the page held
back with a file lease, so it stays inside the confined scope.