The session file is read and removed at startup, and restoring now runs
in its own task, so a shutdown during the restore would have saved only
the apps launched so far. Until the restore finishes, a shutdown stops
it and saves the restored list unchanged.
Frames queued for a slow appd were sent only on later traffic, so the
end of a burst could wait indefinitely. A timer now retries the flush
every 20 ms, armed only while frames are queued. weft-appd restores the
previous session in its own task, so waiting for the compositor no
longer delays clients or shutdown, and the security docs describe the
launch refusal and the backlog limit exactly.
A full socket buffer toward a stalled appd closed the connection and
with it every app. Frames for appd are now queued whole and flushed on
each send and read, and only a backlog beyond the frame limit or a
write error ends the connection. A disconnect report is applied only
when it comes from the session's current client, so a client closed
with an earlier appd cannot remove the mapping of a new session that
reused its ID. A failure to watch a new appd connection no longer
leaves the compositor refusing every later one.
weft-appd refuses a launch with 503 before anything starts while the
compositor is not connected, and waits up to 10 s for the connection
before restoring the previous session.
Session clients could still create layer-shell surfaces, including
full-screen overlays with exclusive keyboard input, and bind the input
method, which bypassed the refusal of shell roles. Both globals are now
hidden from clients bound to a session.
The compositor IPC connection is tracked by its read source, so a write
error can no longer let a second peer feed the same buffers; a failed
write shuts the connection down. An undecodable or oversized frame ends
the connection, since descriptors could otherwise pair with the wrong
messages, and the descriptor limit counts only descriptors no message
claims, so a burst of launches is not taken for abuse. When appd's
connection ends, the compositor closes the clients of the sessions it
attached.
weft-appd notices when the compositor closes the connection, resends a
message whose write failed after reconnecting, and refuses a launch
while the compositor is not connected instead of starting an app shell
that can never connect.
The compositor stored appd's (pid, session) announcements and never used
them, so no surface could be attributed to a session and any client
could claim any app ID or the panel role.
weft-appd now creates a connected socket pair for each session, gives
the app shell one end as standard input with WAYLAND_SOCKET=0 and no
WAYLAND_DISPLAY, and sends the other end to the compositor with the
session and app ID over the compositor IPC socket (SCM_RIGHTS). The
compositor inserts it as a client bound to that session: holding the
connection is the session's identity. A session's zweft_shell windows
carry its app ID, the panel and overlay roles are refused to sessions
with a new role_not_permitted error, the session's first toplevel is
reported to appd, an ended session's client is closed, and a client's
disconnection is reported. The compositor accepts one appd connection
at a time.
The counter desktop check now requires the compositor to bind the app's
client to its session and to close it when the session is terminated.
Every host import was registered and callable whatever the package
declared, read-only directory capabilities were preopened read-write,
and appd launched packages whose capabilities it could not satisfy. The
fetch import also could not be linked: the host returned a tuple where
the WIT declares the response record, so any component importing
weft:app/fetch failed to instantiate.
One capability vocabulary now lives in weft_ipc_types::capability and
is used by weft-pack, weft-appd and weft-runtime. weft-appd derives a
session's grants once, before the session exists, and refuses the launch
with error 403 when a capability is unknown, unsupported (hw:gpu:*) or
unsatisfiable (documents without an XDG documents directory). The
documents directory now comes from user-dirs.dirs instead of a guessed
~/Documents.
The runtime receives grants explicitly (--grant CAP, --preopen
HOST::GUEST::ro|rw), preopens read-only directories read-only, and checks
the grant on every notifications, clipboard and fetch call. Fetch accepts
only http and https to granted hosts, returns redirects and HTTP error
statuses as responses instead of following or failing them, and bounds
connect time, total time and response size. The file portal takes
read-only directories with --allow-read and refuses writes there.
tests/runtime/check_grants.py runs the real runtime on a probe component
under each kind of grant and checks the outcome of every operation; it
fails when read-only data is writable or an import ignores its grant.
The appd dispatch tests that read WEFT_RUNTIME_BIN now hold the env lock
shared with the tests that set it.
- flake.nix, infra/nixos/: NixOS VM with Mesa, virtio-gpu, Wayland,
systemd user services for compositor and session supervisor
- infra/vm/: QEMU build and run scripts
- .github/workflows/ci.yml: add Linux job to type-check weft-servo-shell
and weft-app-shell with --features servo-embed
- docs/architecture.md, docs/security.md, docs/building.md: replace
stale pre-implementation design documents
- README.md: rewrite to reflect current codebase
- crates/weft-servo-shell/SERVO_PIN.md: update implementation status and add
SpiderMonkey process boundary statement